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certainty as to these two possibilities, however, the Court is following
a recent trend as exemplified by the case of Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corporation,31 in which the owner of a restaurant serving unfit
food was held liable on an implied warranty of fitness for consumption.
This case is but another application of the implied warranty theory to
cement public policy into the law. The result reached is desirable in
that it will cause the retailer to exercise greater caution in selecting
reliable suppliers.

J.

RICHARD PETERS

INTERSTATE COMMERCE: REGULATION OF LOCAL
TRANSIT COMPANIES
United States v. Capital Transit Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 115 (1949)
The Capital Transit Company, which operates bus and street car
lines within the District of Columbia, previously operated a line across
the Potomac River to the Pentagon Building in Virginia. The Interstate Commerce Commission compelled the company to set joint fares
with Virginia transportation companies. 1 After this order the company
abandoned its lines into Virginia and now operates solely within the
District of Columbia. The Interstate Commerce Commission nevertheless continued to regulate the company. The Capital Transit Company brought suit to enjoin this regulation. The district court allowed
the injunction on the ground that the Commission did not have jurisdiction after the abandonment of the Virginia lines. 2 On certiorari to
the Supreme Court, HELD, the injunction should be set aside, since the
complainant was engaged in interstate commerce. Judgment reversed,
Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Reed and Jackson dissenting.
Essentially there are two problems in this case in regard to the
regulation of interstate commerce. The first concerns the power of the
Interstate Commerce Commission to obtain jurisdiction of the company when it operated the line into Virginia. Section 303(b)(8) of
3189 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949).

'Alexandria, Bancroft & Washington Transit Co. and Washington, Virginia &
Maryland Coach Co., Inc.
2
Capital Transit Co. v. United States, 7 CCH FED. CARRIER CAS. 2036 (1949).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss3/11

2

Cone: Interstate Commerce: Regulation of Local Transit Companies
CASE COMMENTS

the Motor Carrier Act3 provides that, unless it is necessary in order to
carry out the national transportation policy,4 interstate commerce shall
not be regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the
Motor Carrier Act when the transportation in question is solely within
a single municipality, between contiguous municipalities, or within a
zone adjacent to and commercially a part of the municipality or
municipalities. Transportation furnished by the Capital Transit Company clearly fell within these provisions, since the area between
Washington and the Pentagon was a contiguous municipality. The
Court in a previous case involving the company, however, had affirmatively found that the regulation of this transportation was essential
to the national transportation policy, since the traffic moving to the
Pentagon Building was important to national defense. 5 For this reason
Section 303(b)(8) would not apply, and the Interstate Commerce
Commission was not prohibited from regulating the company on the
basis of the statutory exception dealing with contiguous municipalities.
The second and principal question in this case involves the determination of the theory under which the Supreme Court is permitting
regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The extent of
regulation by the Federal Government has been determined in the
past by three theories, popularly called the burden theory, the instrumentalities theory, and the flow theory. Although these theories
tend to overlap each other" and have not been applied to the same7
extent in interpreting all statutes involving the commerce power,
they are nevertheless useful in analyzing decisions in this field. To
determine if, under the Motor Carrier Act, Congress intended to delegate to the Interstate Commerce Commission the full extent of its
power to regulate interstate commerce as delineated by the various
theories, it is necessary to analyze these theories in connection with the
Motor Carrier Act itself.
Under the burden theory, sometimes called the Shreveport Doctrine,8 the regulation of purely intra-state activities has been permitted
349 STAT. 546 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §303(b)(8) (1946).
454 STAT. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §1 (1946).
5
United States v. Capital Transit Co., 325 U.S. 357 (1945).
6
See McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin,
301 U.S. 1 (1937); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
7
1Ilinois Cent. R.R. v. Behrens, 233 U.S. 473, 477 (1914); Simpson v. Shepard,
230 U.S. 352, 399 (1913); Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1, 48
(1912); United States v. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557 (U.S. 1871).
8
See 18 GEo. WAH. L, REv. 422, 424 (1950).
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when the activity affects the flow or constitutes a burden on interstate
commerce. 9 The use of this notion apparently is effectively precluded
by Sections 303(a)(10) 1° and 316(e)" of the Motor Carrier Act.
Section 303(a)(10), in defining interstate commerce as "commerce
between any place in a state and any place in another state or between
places in the same state through another state," seems to prevent the
regulation of the Capital Transit Company by the Interstate Commerce
Commission under the Motor Carrier Act after the abandonment of
the Virginia line. That Congress intended to prohibit the use of the
burden theory, that is, the result reached in the Shreveport cases, under
the Motor Carrier Act is further strengthened by Section 316(e), which
provides:
"... nothing in this chapter shall empower the commission to
prescribe or in any manner regulate the rate, fare, or charge for
intrastate transportation .. .for the purpose of removing discrimination against interstate commerce or for any purpose
whatever."
The second basis under which regulation has been permitted is
the so-called instrumentalities theory. Under this theory, regulation
by Congress under the interstate commerce clause has been permitted,
for example, when a carrier ordinarily transports goods that are moving
across state lines although the carrier itself remains at all times within
one state and may not at all times transport such goods. Navigable
waters,' 2 railroads,' 3 telegraph and telephone systems,1 4 and ships 15
have all been classed as instrumentalities of interstate commerce. It is
significant to note that in many cases in which the term "instrumentality of interstate commerce" or "highway of interstate commerce"
has been used there have been present goods or passengers moving in
interstate traffic, so that in reality the definition of "instrumentality of
interstate commerce" must often depend upon determination of
OHouston, E. & W.T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, (1914).
1'49 STAT. 544 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §303(a)(10) (1946).
1149 STAT. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §316(e) (1946).
"-New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328 (1926); Missouri v. Union Elec. Light
& Power Co.. 42 F.2d 62
)i C.D. Mo. 11430).
"Nl:i:s(,uri, K. & T. R.R. v. Nortlhern Okla. Rys., 25 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 192, ).
14 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lee, 174 Ky. 210, 192 S.W. 70 (1917).
1";Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U.S. -359 (1926).
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